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Abstract
Due to the centre dominated intergovernmental fiscal relation; the decentralization efforts of
Nepal remained incomplete even after 9 years of the implementation of LSGA. The financial
health of Nepalese local governments, particularly small municipalities is vulnerable as they
are going to loose a big chunk of resource called LDF in near future and so far no substitute for
it is prescribed or recommended. Many researchers have argued that the proper implementation
of property based tax could replace the LDF but there are many concerns and several barriers
with such tax system. Firstly it has limited scope to improve the financial health of those
municipalities and secondly there are many obstacles: tax culture of the local people, weak
institutional capabilities, absence of proper database, untrained human resource and rampant
corruption are few of them. Nevertheless, the municipalities have distinct comparative and
competitive advantages, which should be explored and implemented accordingly.
Key Words: Revenue Assignment, Expenditure Assignment, Intergovernmental Transfer,
Borrowing
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1.

General Introduction

1.1.

Introduction

3915 Village level government units named as Village Development Committees (VDCs) are
the lower level government institutions in Nepal, whereas 58 semi-urban towns and other cities
are characterized by the umbrella term 'Municipalities': the capital city, Kathmandu is
Metropolitan Corporation, four other big cities are Sub-Metropolitan Corporations and there
are 53 municipalities. The general perception of western cities doesn't apply to Nepalese
municipalities because these cities lack the basic urban services and infrastructure, are heavily
influenced by urban poverty and are heavily polluted.

Articles 138, 139 and 140 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2006 have provisioned and
briefly outlined the modality of local governance for the country but it failed to give concrete
basis for it. In the case, the Local Self Governance Act, 1999 (LSGA) is the basic law that
deals the local governance system in Nepal. The LSGA has basically followed the principle of
subsidiary to allocate the different roles to the different tires of government. The elected
representatives of the local people are authorized to serve their voters or tax-payers for the
betterment of the society and the people.

The LSGA has devolved different sectors to be taxed by the municipalities and different
responsibilities to be fulfilled by them. The internal resources, intergovernmental transfer,
external grants and the borrowing are the sectors of resources for the municipalities. The
composition of internal resources is around 65.3 percent of total income that is hugely covered
by Local Development Fund (LDF), a tax collected by the central government by 1.5% of the
total invoice of import through the custom offices and distributed among the municipalities,
which is not the sustainable source of income. The reason is, as per the conditionality of
Nepalese membership to WTO, LDF (34.5% of total revenue of the municipalities) should be
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abolished by 2011. Hence the Nepalese municipalities are about to loose a big chunk of their
resources. In addition to that, as Nepalese municipalities are suffering from a huge rate of
population growth due to internal migration: the expenditure responsibility is increasing very
rapidly.

Municipalities
Municipalities in Nepal are basically small towns surrounded by rural villages and most of
them are district headquarters. However all district headquarters are not recognized as the
municipalities and there are many districts with more than two municipalities on it. So, it could
be concluded that the government is recognizing those towns as a municipality, who fulfil
certain requirements set by the LSGA.
Due to the urbanization process of Nepal and due to the internal migration trend, municipalities
are getting more importance and are more focused for development activities. Some 21 percent
people live in the urban centres in the present-day Nepal but in accordance with a UNDP/ADB
report, half of the population of Nepal will be living in urban areas by 2035 AD (Devkota,
2005).

1.2.

Methodology Used and Limitations

The study is basically focused on the sustainable financial management of the Nepalese
municipalities. The municipalities focused on this study are quite young municipalities which
were granted the municipality status some 12 years ago. Although to study comparatively, the
data of some other municipalities (such as Bidur municipality) has also been analyzed. As
these are the new municipalities with short history of operation, the people living there are
reluctant to pay tax and user charges and hesitant to go for municipal services because they
were not used to pay for such services before. The study is basically focused on the
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municipalities who don't have strong financial resources and are very weak in institutional
capabilities as well.

In the case study basis, two municipalities (Ratnanagar and Bidur) have been selected on
different basis and different competencies: both are small municipalities with the population
below 50000 inhabitants but Ratnanagar is a young municipality based on Terai region
however Bidur Municipality is not that young, a municipality from hilly regions and not that
far from the capital city Kathmandu. According to their geographical location; they have
different comparative and competitive advantages. The table 1 given in the annex shows the
basic information about those two municipalities including the financial as well as expenditure
part of them.

Key persons from the municipalities, the ministry, political parties and from civil society
including municipal association of Nepal have been interviewed. Local residents and the
possible tax payers have been interviewed with focus questions especially related with their tax
culture. The secondary data is obtained from the report published jointly by GTZ/udle and
GoN, MLD. Additionally, the population census of 2001 and living standard survey conducted
by Central Bureau of Statistics were also reviewed during the study.

2.

Principles and Policies of Local Development

The LSGA has outlined following basic principles and policies of local self governance:

(a) Devolution of such powers, responsibilities, and means and resources as are required to
make the Local Bodies capable and efficient in local self-governance.
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(b) Building and development of institutional mechanism and functional structure in Local
Bodies capable of considering for local people and bearing responsibilities.

(c) Devolution of powers to collect and mobilize such means and resources as are required to
discharge the functions, duties, responsibility and accountability conferred to the Local Bodies.

3.

Brief history of local (self) governance in Nepal

The history of decentralization goes hand in hand with the history of Nepal or even before that.
There were the practices of allocating various rights or devolving many functions to the society
even some 1600 years ago. Grama, Tala, Dranga of Lichivi reign (a regime which is believed
existed in Nepal during 1100 to 1400 AD) could be the best example of such institutions. Since
then, the decentralization process continued in Nepal, though the increments and curtailments
had gone side by side with different successors or rulers and with different regimes until Nepal
took its steps toward modernization.

Nepal entered to the modern era after it sacks the family rule of Ranas (a family that ruled the
country for 104 years) and enjoyed democracy in 1950. In the process of creating democratic
foundations to the nation, two different acts: the Municipality Act of 1953 and the Village Act
of 1956 were enacted. The premature political system of the country again faced another
setback in the year 1960 when the then elected government was scrapped by the King, who
took the political power that lasts for next 30 years. The political move was claimed to
establish an indigenous political system that shoots with the soil: hence decentralization was
considered as priority agenda. Previous Acts were replaced by the Town Panchayat Act of
1962 and Village Panchayat Act of 1962, respectively. In the course of time various (to be
more specific: eight) studies were conducted to strengthen the decentralization process, various
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recommendations were prescribed, most of such recommendations were enacted, different
institutional arrangements and changes were made.

After the restoration of multi party system in the country in 1990 and after the enactment of the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990: effective decentralization was emphasized to
strengthen peoples' participation in the development. Although, by mentioning it on the
directive principles of the state policy, the responsibility was given to the elected parliament to
enact proper law. The DDC Act, VDC Act and Municipality Act were endorsed and people
chose their representatives to these bodies through elections. There were many concerns
regarding these Acts which lead to form The High Level Decentralization Coordination
Committee on the chairmanship of then Prime Minister. The Committee diagnosed different
problems and urged to rewrite the statute, which was the turning point and the foundation for
enactment of the Local Self Governance Act, (LSGA) 1999.

4.

Main Characteristics of Nepalese Local Self Governance

4.1.

Application of the Principle of subsidiary

There is a movement throughout the world to move the decisions that affect people closer to
those affected (McLure Jr., 1998). The first fundamental step in the design of a system of
intergovernmental fiscal relations should be a clear assignment of functional responsibilities
among different levels of government (McLure, ... ).

The local level governments of Nepal are supposed to provide those goods and services to the
people that could be more perfectly delivered if it is done at the local level. It could be
observed that the power sharing between central and local level governments have their own
characteristics and international practices are not totally followed. There are various reasons
for it and [t]here is no absolute best way for deciding which level of government should be
7

responsible for particular public services (McLure, ... ). One of the main constraints is the
institutional capacities of the local governments to handle the responsibilities. Additionally, in
the course of time, the central government's unwillingness and hesitation to handover the line
agencies to the local government make the decentralization movement of Nepal incomplete,
even after many years. This is due to the improper design of fiscal decentralization because if
systems are not designed with forethought, however, decentralization can instead create serious
problems. The transition economies find themselves midway in the process, and mistakes are
already being made (Bird, 1995).

4.2.

Prioritization of the assignments

The local level governments are supposed to conduct their assembly meetings annually with
the wide participation of the local people in the presence of civil society and media. Such
assembly is the authority that identifies the sector to be taxed, fixes and changes the tax rate
and approves the audit reports. In addition to routine administrative functions, the assembly
approves the annual budget that is the priority paper of the projects to be operated for the
coming year.

4.3.

Resource Sharing

The Interim Constitution of Nepal and LSGA has provisioned for the sharing of the national
resources between central government and local level governments but it is unsolved agenda
for many years as the previous constitution of Nepal also have directed the country in same
direction. Since the enactment of then Constitution in 1990 it remained a complicated task for
many years and always the local level governments are found weaker in the negotiation
process. Even though there are some challenge-funds for the well functioning local
governments but many of them are deprived from adequate resources from the centre that is
heavily influenced by the political power structures.
8

4.4.

Investment Gap

Subnational governments may have unequal capacity to finance public services because of
regional differences in income, as well as differences in access to easily taxed bases, such as
natural resources (McLure Jr., 1998). During the decentralization process of Nepal, even
though various sectors have been devolved and could be taxed by the local level governments,
the scope of local revenue mobilization is less than the expenditure assignment, which created
strong financial imbalance. Fiscal imbalances are worrisome because they draw resources
away from investment and, when deficits persist, lead to a buildup of government debt and a
consequent servicing burden that can become unsustainable and can threaten macroeconomic
stability (IMF, 1999). This is more painful in the transition phase of the country when the
country needs huge amount of capital investment to build basic infrastructures and upgrade the
level of services delivered to the people.
4.5.

Unfunded Mandates

The budget system in Nepal is known as the line item budged. It is divided on the expenditure
topics and has very limited mobility to shift from one topic to another. Though the LSGA have
assigned various roles to the LGs, due to the shortage of financial resources, many of such
responsibilities are whether remained unfunded or never come to the priority list of the LGs.
For example, a VDC is free to run a primary school in the mother language of the majority of
the people living there but the VDCs can't run such type of schools due to the lack of
resources. In the same way, the LGs are assigned to preserve the local culture, traditions,
scripts, languages, historical places, architect, and monuments but the task is seldom funded
properly. Such unfunded mandates may yield dissatisfaction to the local people for not
respecting their culture and rights.
In addition to that the central government has devolved various unfunded mandates to the LGs
and the LGs are in pressure to implement those tasks without resources. The management of
9

the street lights could be the best example. The central government had handover the
responsibility to manage the street lights to the municipalities but failed to handover the
resources to them. The municipalities are now heavily indebted in electricity bills due to the
street lights and a strong conflict is going on between the municipalities and the electricity
authority. The municipal roads could be the next example of heavily unfunded mandate to the
municipalities. The government handed over the municipal roads to the municipalities without
giving the resources.

4.6.

Institutional Framework and Constraints

The institutional capability of the municipalities is weak in various ways. They are not well
supported by proper database, technology, financial resources, infrastructure and human
resource. So, the powers and responsibilities given to them are rarely functioned properly.
Additionally, for almost 5 years, the local governments are deprived from the elected
leadership of the people.

The revenue mobilization is the weaker part of the local governance in the absence of elected
representatives and the local governments in Nepal are charged for rampant corruption within
their system. In one side they are deprived from trained and competent menpower in the other
side the role of private sector and civil society is also neglected.

5.

Expenditure Assignment (Sectors Devolved to the Local Governments)

The LSGA, basically following the principle of subsidiary; devolved various roles and
responsibilities to the local government units. In addition to that, the central government
devolves various responsibilities to the local government through annual budget as well. The
major sectors devolved to the municipalities of Nepal by the Act are as follows:
Drinking water
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Education
Public health services
Language and culture
Agriculture
Tourism and cottage industries
Infrastructure and transport
Sports
Irrigation
River and soil erosion control
Forest and environment protection
Human resource development
Implement the cooperative movement
Records keeping
Disaster management
Various programs of social security
Private sector promotion and development
Promote peoples participation

6.

Revenue Assignment (Sectors devolved for Resource Generation)

The trend toward fiscal decentralization and the transfer of some revenue-raising and
expenditure authority from central to lower-level and subnational governments is, in part, a
political reaction from below against the long years of extensive central control (Bird, 1995).
Although, the LSGA has devolved various responsibilities to local and municipal level
governments, such responsibilities should be supported by proper revenue capabilities. If
subnational governments are responsible for expensive social services such as health and
education, the pressure on subnational revenues will be much greater and the conventional
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prescription is less likely to produce sustainable results (Bird, 1999). The LSGA, to perform
the job mentioned above, has devolved various sectors of revenue to be taxed by the local
governments. The scope of such resources could be classified as follows:
House and land tax
Land revenue tax
Market shop tax
Vehicle tax
Entertainment tax
Rent tax
Advertisement tax
Business Tax
Commercial Video Tax
Different service charges:
On sanitation, drainage and sewage
Entrance charges for tourist points
Charges for gardens and for picnic
Different types of fees
Licensing fees of different equipments
Approval fees
Recommendation fees
Income through selling of different things
Natural resources like sand and boulders
Forest products
Products of public ponds and garden
Central grant
Borrowing power
12

7.

Current Financial Picture and the Envisaged Problems

Currently there is a huge gap between revenue assignment and expenditure assignment in the
municipalities. Firstly the municipalities are failure to mobilize internal resources as it is
supposed to be done due to various reasons; secondly the rate of revenue increment can't cope
the rate of expenditure growth. Though the size of the revenue is also growing in incremental
way, but it failed to fulfil the growing expenditure needs.

Furthermore the Nepalese municipalities are not getting LDF by the year 2011, which is the
34.5 percent contributor of the overall revenue of the municipalities due to the membership of
Nepal to WTO, because it is one of the major precondition of any member country that
imposing any tax should have rational and in fact, local development fee does not stand in this
rationale (Chhetri, 2002).

Additionally the rate of population growth in the municipalities is quite high (about 6.1% in the
case of Bharatpur municipality) then the national average (2.24%). This is basically due to the
internal migration from the village to such cities. Such migration and population growth is
leading to develop the municipalities in unplanned way and furthermore it is contributing to the
growth of slums. People in the rural villages want to migrate to the city centres to enjoy the
better services like health care, education, access to information and communication etc.
Consequently the revenue assignment is getting bigger and bigger day by day.

In addition to that, due to the various awareness and advocacy campaigns and political and
social movements; the bargaining power of the people has been improved and they are
demanding more services in the right based way. Due to the various political changes in the
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past decade, and due to the promises made in different political fronts, the local people are
demanding more and prompt municipal services and it is contributing the growth of
expenditure assignment more rapidly.

8.

Possible Answers of the Problems

The reluctance of the central government to handover its line agencies to the local government
and as the local governments were not financially empowered; it is widely accepted and
believed that Nepal never tried to decentralized in true way and Nepalese municipalities were
not exception to it. Mr. Romanath Oli in his interview opines that: in one hand the horizon of
responsibilities has been increased but in the other hand the sectors devolved for taxation are
not strong enough to manage them. He also argues that as municipalities are still very weak on
financial autonomy, the concept of self governance adopted by Nepal has flaws on itself (Oli,
2001).
To solve the problems explained above, various researchers have suggested that effective
implementation of the house and land tax or integrated property tax could be the best solution.
Additionally, the other financial tools such as: redesigning of intergovernmental transfer
system and facilitation for borrowing from internal and external resources could be adopted. I
have tried to analyze the possibilities of those three options separately and highlighted the
major policy changes we need to bring to let the system work. Additionally, I also have
analyzed the other possible and potential resources that could help fulfil the gap between
revenue and expenditure assignment.

8.1.

Implementation of the House and Land Tax or Integrated Property Tax

Property (House and Land) Tax and Integrated Property Tax
The system of tax the government levies from the people by certain percent of the total
property they owned on the valuation of it at the beginning of the fiscal year is called property
14

tax. For the purpose of property tax, not only the house and land but also the vehicles, shares,
bond, ornaments, cash, bank balance etc. be evaluated (Aryal, 2001). In other words, for the
purpose of property based tax, not only the house and land but also all the other property (cash
and kind) will be evaluated and the tax is levied by certain percent on it. Normally, the
property is evaluated in the price index of the beginning of every fiscal year and could be
different year by year.
LSGA don't define what is integrated property tax but according to definition given by
Regulation of LSGA, "Integrated property" means the lands within municipal area and
physical structures such as wall, building, godown, shade, garage etc. built thereon (Rule 2 (e).
For the purpose of integrated property tax, in addition to the evaluation of land, building and
other property, all the physical infrastructures such as compound wall, shades, warehouse,
garage etc. will be evaluated and the final amount is taxed by a certain percent as prescribed by
the law and regulation.
According to LSGA, the Nepalese municipalities are immune to implement whether house and
land tax or the integrated property tax in their respective territory. So far majority of the
number of municipalities have adopted this tax system but the big municipalities are still
hesitant to follow it as they fear that they may loose the amount of money they are mobilizing
through the house and land tax if they adopted it. It is believed that the integrated property tax
is scientific and by implementing it, the municipalities could broaden their tax horizon. It is
calculated on the municipality basis and many researchers criticise it as a flaw because if a
person has two set of property in two separate jurisdictions of the municipalities, the concerned
person could twice enjoy the threshold facility.
Rationale
The development in the local level brings various changes in the local level and the values of
the property will also be raised. Hence, if the people want their locality be developed or the
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price of their property to be raised, they should also contribute in this process by paying house
and land tax (Aryal, 2001).
Regulatory Framework
The annual council meetings of the Municipalities are authorized to fix the rate of house and
land tax or integrated property tax that is based on the valuation of the property. By evaluating
the tax rate of the property, it could be observed that the tax rates are fixed on the progressive
way. Theoretically the valuation of the property that falls below the threshold are exempted
from the tax and the tax rate get higher and higher as the valuation of the property gets bigger
and bigger. In the case of Bidur Municipality, no such exemption has been made although the
tax rate is fixed in the progressive way. The table 2 given in the annex shows the general tax
rates decided by the government based on the valuation of the property.

Contribution
Municipal taxes especially the property based tax (land and house tax) could be one of the
sustainable taxes but it needs sound database system and efficient operation at municipal level
(Mahat, 2002). Although the house and land tax or the integrated property tax is considered as
one of the major lifeline of the municipalities whether in the present context or in the absence
of LDF; the real contribution of it on the municipal own source resource is not that
encouraging. According the data of Fiscal Year 2005/006, the house and land tax or the
integrated property tax has contributed the own source revenue only by 8.02 percent.

Table 3 and 4 given in the annex show the comparative chart of Ratnanagar and Bidur
municipality explains that the property based tax is not that strong to support the financial
burden of the municipality. In the case of Ratnanagar, it contributes by 13.14 percent that is
much above than the national average but it is much more poor in the case of Bidur
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municipality as the property based tax contributes to the own source revenue of Bidur
municipality only by 6.26 percent.

The Tax Culture
Mostly people in Nepal ask for municipal services for free of cost; this is partly because most
of the citizen need further awareness / education programme and partly because our
municipalities provided with municipal services free of cost in the past (Mahat, 2002). The
local people or the possible taxpayers are reluctant to pay such taxes because they were not
used to pay these taxes and during the study, it is also noted that the municipalities failed to
translate the importance of such taxes in the mindset of the local residents. Most of the
members participated in the focused group discussion during the study opined that they are
penalized by declaring their locality as a municipality.

The local people have many questions and concerns regarding the house and land tax or the
integrated property tax and very few of them were found aware about the total system of this
tax: who decides the tax rate, how much they need to pay and when etc. Although the
encouraging factor is that, they are keen to know the system especially the evaluation process
of their property. Additionally they are also interested to know the offer or the subsidies on tax
amount if they declared their property by themselves.

Many of them were having dissatisfaction on the process of taxation in the local level,
particularly on the process of house and land tax. They were with the view that although the
valuation of their property may be bigger enough to be taxed but the productivity of it is
negligible. In other words their property may meet the parameters of the tax system to be taxed
but the real income of it is so low, if they are taxed on it, they will loose their property; sooner
or later. According to them, due to the Nepalese culture, the house and land they have is their
17

inheritance property developed through generations and due to its market value it could meet
the taxation parameters but as it is not generating economic benefits, it would be injustice to
tax them.

The next concern raised by them is the process of fine or penalty for not paying the tax in time.
They were found interested to know the scheme of waiver of the penalty on it. They were with
the view that the municipality should announce the scheme of waiver of penalty and fine and
should encourage the people to pay tax. They suggested that once the client starts paying tax,
the continuation of it is highly possible.

Furthermore the participants who are willing to pay tax were raising the concerns of their
pileup amount of tax. Even though they are ready to pay it, they can't clear the backlog at once.
They demanded the system of payment in instalment basis.

Problems for Effective Implementation
There are different problems on effective implementation of the house and land tax or the
integrated property tax. Various of such problems are related with the municipalities
themselves. Few of such problems and barriers could be described as:
Institutional Capabilities: most of the municipalities are not capable enough to mobilize such
tax from the point of view of institutional competencies. They don't have trained men power to
implement these taxes, additionally they don't have technology and mechanisms such as
computer software etc. to calculate those taxes.
Data Source and Database: lack of proper database could be the other problem of
municipalities to implement such tax system. In addition to the number of households, they
don't have additional data regarding those houses and land. Additionally, even if they have
some data regarding it, that is not updated and compiled at all.
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Awareness among the people: we already discussed the level of awareness among people and
the concerns raised by them. It is observed that massive level of awareness campaign is
necessary to educate the possible tax payers by the municipalities. Door to door program could
be more effective on this connection.
Tax Culture: tax culture among the people could be another hurdle to implement the house and
land tax effectively. The municipalities need to convince their taxpayers that how differently
the municipal services are being provided, in how many ways they are being benefited from
those services and why the municipality want the people to contribute in the process.

It should be a difficult question to answer that what would be the real picture if the property
based tax is mobilized in maximum capacity? The present data structure don't support to find
an answer of the question however by comparing the number of household and analyzing it
with the tax rate with few assumptions; we could generate some ideas. However we can say for
sure that even in that case the property based tax can neither substitute the LDF nor it will be
the major contributor of them in the near future.

8.2.

Intergovernmental Transfer

If we compare the expenditure assignments with the revenue assignments of the local
governments in Nepal, we found large gap between them. The gap must be filled in one of two
ways: by giving local governments more revenue raising powers or by revenue transfers from
the central government to the subnational governments (Bahl, 2000). Taxing local lobbying
activities under the revenue-sharing scheme is one of the effective ways to promote fiscal
reconstruction. In this policy scheme, some of the tax revenue should be returned uniformly to
the local governments involved (Ihori, 2004).
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Main transfers and shares
As the internal revenue mobilization of local governments in Nepal is very weak: they are
largely dependent on intergovernmental transfer and other available financial tools. The
intergovernmental transfer is roughly about 75 percent of the total income of the local
governments of Nepal, however in the case of municipalities it is about 60 percent.
In general, the intergovernmental transfer in Nepal could be broadly divided on two categories
- grants and revenue sharing. The local governments receive three types of grants- 1)
Administrative Grant, 2) General Purpose Block Grant and 3) Conditional Grant. The various
types of revenue are being shared by central government and local governments and it has both
top-down and bottom up approaches. The transfer system between central government and
local governments is channelled through Ministry of Local Development.

Main reasons for using transfers
Funding the expenditure assignment of the LGs could be the main reason of using transfers in
Nepal. Without such transfer, the LGs can't perform their responsibility in proper way. The
Interim Constitution also recognizes the intergovernmental transfer as the means of financial
source to the LGs and recognizes them as the shareholders of the central treasury.
Normally the expenditure assignment between central government and local governments
creates vertical imbalance of revenue distribution. The local governments normally have more
responsibility but not adequately supported that create imbalance between central and local
governments and to address this problem, the intergovernmental transfers is essential.
In addition to that, balancing the disparities between different local government or the
horizontal imbalance is also a strong reason for the transfer because some LGs are financially
strong where the others don't have strong financial basis and the capacity of mobilizing local
resources is also different among them. The intergovernmental transfer could be best solution
to manage such disparities.
20

Method of transfer and main allocation principles
In general, the local governments receive three types of grants- 1) Administrative Grant, 2)
General Purpose Block Grant and 3) Conditional Grant. By its name, the administrative grant
is utilized to manage recurrent costs, such as salaries and allowances of the centrally deputed
officials, and supplementary salary of the locally recruited staffs. The local governments have
no discretionary power to utilize this fund according to their priorities. The general purpose
block grant is unconditional and the local governments are immune to use it according to their
priorities by following their own budgetary and audit regulations. The local governments also
receive conditional grants to construct infrastructures by following specific guidance provided
by the central government.
The general purpose block grant could be different among different LGs on the basis of various
factors. The distribution of such grant is carried out on the basis of set formula in one hand and
on the level of performance of the LGs on the other. Hence, it could also be categorized as the
formula based and the performance based grant system. The system or the formula is in
operation since few fiscal years and based on the different indicators such as: human
development index, population, geographical area and the cost factors. According to the Local
Bodies Fiscal Commission Report, 2004, the weight to these factors has been divided as: 50,
20, 20 and 10 percent respectively.
Although we have developed formula based grant system, the size of the transfer is principally
determined by the parliament because the amount of money to be transferred is fixed through
the annual budget. Basically the expenditure assignment of the LGs is the decisive factor to
determine the size of the budget to be transferred and it is influenced heavily by the political
commitment. The policy shift announced through the annual budget could be other influential
factor for the transfer.
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The conditional grant is distributed on demand and priority basis. The concerned department of
the government carryout the need assessment and other necessary analysis and finalized the
budget. The Department of the central government not only provide necessary resources for
such projects but also the proper guidelines and indicators to be followed. The LGs have to be
accountable and to report the concerned Department for the progress made and the
Departments and National Planning Commission through their own channels monitor them.
Nevertheless, the most important part of intergovernmental transfer in Nepal is the practice of
revenue sharing between central government and LGs. The one most important source of
money to the LGs is the share of royalty they receive upon the exploitation of natural
resources, such as: from hydropower power, mines and from timber industry.
The revenue mobilization and sharing authority is also distributed among LGs and it circulates
to both directions: top-down and bottom up. The DDCs in the intermediate level and the
VDCs and Municipalities at the lower level share the resources they have mobilized with each
other. For example the DDCs are entitled to get 25% of the Land Revenue or Land Tax
collected by the VDCs or the municipalities whereas the VDCs and municipalities get 35-50%
of the earning of DDCs from the commercial utilization of the raw materials (sand, stone,
boulders etc) and recyclable waste. The DDCs also share 35% of the royalty they receives from
mines, timber industries, tourist entry fees and the money they get from hydropower plants
with VDCs and municipalities.

8.3.

Borrowing

As per the law, the local governments of Nepal are competent to burrow from banks, any
organization and institutions by fulfilling certain conditionality set by the law. However,
according to the legal provision and general practice, the municipal borrowing should be
utilized for capital investment but not for recurrent cost.
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Legal Provisions for borrowing
The LSGA, 1999 has provisioned the municipal and local borrowing and set the conditions to
be fulfilled to exercise the power. According to the LSGA, The Village Development
Committee (VDC), Municipalities and District Development Committees (DDC) are immune
to burrow from different lenders to fulfill the investment gap between expenditure assignment
and revenue assignment. According to the Sec. 148 of LSGA, the Municipalities could raise
the loan from a bank or any other organization according to the policy approved the Municipal
Council.

Although the local bodies (Governments) of Nepal are immune to mobilize the loan from
banks and any other organizations, the international borrowing should be channeled through
the consent of Central Government. The Sec. 263 of LSGA states that the Local Bodies should
get prior approval of Nepal Government to establish contact with foreign governments,
international organizations, diplomatic missions and international non-governmental
organizations.

Regulatory Framework for the Borrowing
According to LSGA, during the course of burrowing, the Nepalese local governments should
fulfill certain requirements. First of all, the local governments should approve the burrowing
policy and modality by the annual Council meetings. After fulfilling such conditions, the local
governments could utilize their moveable or immoveable property as the collateral for
burrowing. In addition to that, the local governments, in the guarantee of the central
government could burrow money from those sources without giving any collateral. In case of
international borrowing and getting money from any international organization the local
government should get consent from the central government.
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What has been done so far!
Even though the Nepalese local governments are immune to burrow from a bank or from other
institutions, there are very rare cases of such burrowing. Particularly, burrowing is tough in the
case of small Municipalities for various reasons. It is believed that borrowing should be used
by the larger subnational governments in developing countries, and they should be given an
incentive to make more use of this source (Bahl, 1999). In the case of big cities, in the project
basis, there are few examples of international burrowing, particularly for infrastructure
development project but it is rarely replicated in other local governments.
The two main features of the municipal borrowing in Nepal are: municipalities get loans from
the Town Development Fund (TFD), a non-commercial source; and the size of the loan
operation is very small (about 2 per cent of total revenue) (Shrestha, 2002). Town
Development Fund (TDF) was established as a specialized public finance institute which lends
to local authorities for infrastructure investment in the form of loan or grant ... TDF in
principle, finances the bankable projects of the municipalities (Mahat, 2002).

Problems for burrowing and scope to improve
The pay-back capacity of the local governments is very weak in Nepal as they don't have
reliable source of income. Next hurdle on this process is the lack of proper lending institution
and agency. Nepal has adopted market economic policy and the government can't force any
bank or financial institution to invest in any particular sector. Institutional worthiness of the
Nepalese local governments is very weak and the bank and financial institutions are hesitating
for lending money to these institutions. The market is shy with them as the level of corruption
in these institutions is believed as quite high. In addition to that, the political uncertainty and
fragile political situation is creating confusion and some time problems in the local level. The
central government is not willing to work as a guarantor in municipal burrowing and most of
the local governments don't have reliable property that could be used as collateral.
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9.

Other Options

Apart from the above mentioned three major options to fulfil the gap between revenue
assignment and expenditure assignment of the Nepalese municipalities; few other
municipalities have proved that they are not totally dependent on LDF and regular sources of
resources however they can generate resources from other sources as well. Bhaktapur is an
example who is generating 38 percent of its total revenue through tourist entry fee (Udle,
2006).
Some of the municipalities have their different comparative and competitive advantages based
on their culture and tradition. For example, the municipalities of eastern part of Nepal could
raise significantly big amount of money from taxes on Hatt Bazar but that is not possible in
western part of Nepal.
Public private partnership (PPP) could be one of the models to provide municipal services to
the people and there are already few good examples of effective implementation of it.
Dhangadi municipality, a middle level town in the far west, has successfully implemented
vegetable market under the built-operate-transfer (BOT) modality of PPP ... Kathmandu
Metropolitan city has signed management contract of Gangabu bus park with the private party
and this has saved a big amount of operation cost of the metropolitan city (Mahat, 2002).
Professional tax is considered as another potential source of revenue of the municipalities
however the scope of professional tax in small municipalities is not that high in comparison to
the big municipalities. Because of the production sector and service sector industries are
mostly located in the big cities, professional tax could be one of the major contributors to them
provided that it is mobilized effectively.
Local governments of Nepal are considered as the stakeholders and shareholders of the
revenue generated through the exploitation of natural resources. In this connection, the
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municipalities with high potentialities of exploitation of natural resources could be benefited
from such resources.

Additionally, experience sharing and replicating the best practices could be another useful tool
for the municipalities. Further more local Governments must actively participate in civic
networks to communicate and learn from each other so as to strengthen local capacity.
Geographic and regional similarities can be emphasized so than sharing information is
productive (Handley, 2008). Utilized technology to share best practices and models for other
grantees, is a next step that will help promote effective balance and change in the system
(Handley, 2008).

Conclusion
Although the LSGA have promised to devolve proper responsibilities and resources to the
Nepalese local governments, the revenue part was inadequately and poorly designed, which
produce huge resource gap between expenditure and revenue assignments. The problem is
much more complicated in the cases of Nepalese municipalities and particularly to the small
municipalities (with limited competencies) as they are going to loose LDF; the single largest
contributor of the total resources; in the near future. Even though the problem was identified
since Nepal got the membership to WTO: nothing has been done concretely to substitute it.
Many researchers have stressed the role of integrated property tax or house and land tax in the
context of the absence of LDF, but it is not likely that property based tax system will
significantly support the small municipalities to fulfil their resource gap: though it's role can't
be underestimated. Additionally, the barriers that could hinder the effective implementation of
the tax system should be identified and solved separately. In addition to that, as different
municipalities have different comparative and competitive advantages and competencies, such
advantages should be explored and mobilized. Finally, as we are in the stage of redesigning of
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the state and governance system; the intergovernmental fiscal imbalance should also be
analyzed and solved in the proper way.
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Annex
Table 1
Comparative Chart of Ratnanagar and Bidur Municipality of Nepal
Heading (FY 05/06)
Total Revenue
Own Source Revenue
Contribution of property based tax
Local Development Fee
Total Expenditure
Current Expenditure
Capital Investment
Number of Employees
Population
Total Revenue Per Capita
Own Source Revenue Per Capita
Total Expenditure Per Capita
Current Expenditure Per Capita
Capital Investment Per Capita
Employees/'000 Population
Local Development Fee Per Capita
Source: GTZ/udle (2007)

Ratnanagar
31,732,000
9,774,000
13.14%
4,824,000 (26.08%)
31,732,000
5,300,000
25,227,100
66
44,551
712.26
219.39
712.26
118.96
566.25
1.48
108.28

Bidur
32,995,000
9,835,000
6.26%
7,176,000 (21.93%)
32,995,000
8,263,800
22,320,450
48
22,317
1478.49
440.70
1478.49
370.30
1000.17
2.15
321.54

Table 2
Tax Rate Chart
Tax Ceiling

Tax Rate

Amount of Tax

Total Tax

Total Property

= or <1000000

0

0

0

1000000

Additional 1000000

300 (Rs.)

300

300

2000000

Additional 3000000

0.05%

1500

1800

5000000

Additional 5000000

0.25%

12500

14300

10000000

Additional 10000000

0.5%

50000

64300

20000000

Additional 20000000

1.50%

300000

364300

40000000

Source (Aryal, 2001)
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Table 3
Comparative Chart
Heading [FY 05/06 (In %)]

Municipality Average

Own Source Revenue to Total Revenue

65.38 %

Depending in LDF in Total Revenue

34.54 %

Contribution of Property Based Tax in Total Revenue

8.02 %

Data Source: GTZ/udle

Table 4
Comparative Chart
Heading [FY 05/06 (In %)]

Ratnanagar

Bidur

Own Source Revenue to Total Revenue

36.88

45.76

Depending in LDF in Total Revenue

21.93

26.08

Contribution of Property Based Tax in Total Revenue

13.14

6.26

Current Expenditure incurred from Own Source 54.85

79.03

Revenue including LDF
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